Archive : Socialist Outlook series 3 - monthly newspaper : 25 - 1999

Kosova: eight decades of repression which spawned the KLA

Geoff Ryan

At the end of the Balkan wars and the First World War the Albanian nation was divided between a number of different states: Albania, Greece and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (which became the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929). Kosova was allocated to Yugoslavia.

Kosova before Tito

During the Second World War Kosova was divided between Germany (which occupied the mineral rich northern part) Bulgaria in the east, with the rest going to Italy.

The Italian-occupied part was integrated into Albania, which had been invaded by Italy and attached to the Italian monarchy in 1938. After the fall of Mussolini, German forces occupied the whole of Kosova.

Many Kosovars welcomed the Italian invasion as it appeared to realise the dream of uniting all Albanians in a single state. The post war settlement had resulted in a majority of Albanians (about 60 per cent) living outside Albania: approximately 70 per cent of them in Kosova.

For the first time Albanian became the language of instruction in schools and was widely used throughout the administration. Serb and Montenegrin settlers – who had moved to Kosova during the colonisation by the Yugoslav government in the 1920s and 1930s – were attacked by Albanians.

A number of collaborationist organisations developed amongst Kosova Albanians: but with the exception of the small number of Albanians who joined the ‘Skanderbeg’ volunteer SS division, most of these organisations were not primarily pro-Nazi. They were motivated mainly by Albanian nationalism often combined with a marked anti-Communism.

Kosova was the area of weakest support for the Partisans. In the Summer of 1940 there were only 239 Party members in Kosova, of whom only 25 were Albanians. In August 1943 a CPY report stated ‘Among the Albanian masses, the Communists are regarded as having sold themselves to the Serbs’.

As a result of the weaknesses of the Partisans the liberation of Kosova was carried out to a large extent by Bulgarian and Soviet forces, particularly in the east. There was a wide-spread Albanian uprising in early 1945, and Kosovo was placed under martial law: thousands of Albanians were killed by the Partisans in the course of suppressing Albanian resistance.

Kosova under Tito

Kosova was incorporated into Yugoslavia largely against the wishes of its inhabitants. The decision to join Kosova to Serbia was passed by acclamation at a meeting in July 1945 of the Regional People’s Council of Kosova, at which only 33 out of the 142 delegates were Albanians.

Under the 1946 Constitution Kosova was recognised as an ‘Autonomous Region’ of Serbia, giving it a lower status than the ‘autonomous Province’ of Vojvodina. Albanians, despite being the third most numerous people in Yugoslavia (behind Serbs and Croats) were not recognised as a ‘Nation’ but merely as a ‘national minority’.

Only ‘Nations’ could have their own republics within the federation: and only ‘Nations’ could secede. Unlike Vojvodina, Kosova did not have its own independent legislature or its own supreme court. Its local administrative units were deprived of any independent decision making power.

Both the Albanian and Yugoslavian CP leaders were, after 1945, in favour of building a wider Balkan federation and there is no reason to suppose that they did not believe that the question of Kosova’s future – and that of other Albanian communities in Yugoslavia – could not be settled amicably within this wider federation. Enver Hoxha produced plans for the unification of the Albanian and Yugoslav armies and, as late as March 1948 was urging Tito to take concrete steps towards the unification of the two states.

After the initial repression the CPY also took steps to meet some Kosovar demands. The Albanian language was given equal status, at least in theory, with Serbo-Croat in legal and official matters.

These small but important measures came to an end with the Stalin-Tito split in 1948 when the Albanian leadership became one of the most implacable opponents of the Yugoslavs.

Effects of the Stalin-Tito split

The split with Stalin, and consequently Albania, led to a period of increased repression of the Albanian population of Yugoslavia. Belgrade was afraid that the Albanian CP would try to mobilise the large Albanian population in Yugoslavia to overthrow the Tito regime. At the same time the Hoxha regime in Albania accused dissidents of being Titoist agents.

The border between the two states was sealed, leading to virtual isolation between Albanians on different sides of the border for several decades.

Throughout the 1950s the Albanian population of Yugoslavia remained largely cowed, subject to continual repression. There were, however, signs of resistance. On May Day 1956 four Kosovar youths flew an Albanian flag in Djakovica. Over the next few months Albanian flags were unfurled over government buildings, schools and on trains. The result was increased repression, with thousands of arrests.

The period 1956-60 saw the development of Albanian literary circles in Kosova, in which Adem Demaci - a future leader of the Kosova Liberation Army - first came to prominence. Demaci was jailed for denouncing the forced deportation of hundreds of thousands of Albanians on the pretext that they were Turks. Other Kosova writers of this period were also forced into exile, or jailed.

The slogan ‘Kosova - Republic’ was first heard on the streets during demonstrations on November 27, 1968 in Prishtina and several other Kosova towns. Other slogans included: ‘We want a University’; ‘Down with colonial policy in Kosova’; ‘Long live Albania’; and ‘Long Live Enver Hoxha’.

Demonstrations rapidly spread throughout Kosova and into Macedonia. These demonstrations resulted in amendments to both the federal and Serbian Constitutions which gave judicial and legislative rights to the autonomous provinces, and direct representation in the federal assembly.

Kosova was also given its own university and flag (that of Albania).

The 1974 Constitution made Kosova (and Vojvodina) a Republic in all but name. Following this came increased Albanianisation of the province, with bilingualism a necessary qualification for employment in public services and four fifths of available posts reserved for Albanians.

In 1976 Adem Demaci, along with 18 other defendants, was again put on trial, charged with various ‘crimes’ including ‘organising against the people and the state’, ‘hostile propaganda’ and forming the ‘National Liberation Movement of Kosova’. The defendants were sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. After Tito’s death

The massive expansion of higher education at the University of Prishtina was not matched by increased job opportunities.

In 1981-2 demonstrations by Albanian students. broke out throughout the province. They were brutally repressed, with over 30,000 soldiers. The protests soon spread beyond students, with increasing numbers of Albanian workers joining, and took on a more political significance. The demand for a Kosova Republic was raised along with slogans such as: ‘Unification with Albania’; ‘We are Albanians not Yugoslavs’ and ‘Long live Adem Demaci’.

Although martial law was lifted after two months there was a steady erosion of Kosovar rights. In September 1981 strict censorship was imposed on the teaching of Albanian history, while the quotas for Kosovar students were gradually reduced. Nor was this confined to Kosova. Hundreds of Albanians were jailed in Macedonia and an attempt was made to make displaying the Albanian flag illegal - despite the fact that there had been no riots in Macedonia.

The Rise of the LDK

The overturning by Milosevic of Kosova’s Constitutional position in 1989 was opposed by virtually all sectors of the Kosovar community. Miners from the Trepca mines went on strike, including a hunger strike underground.

After the Kosova Parliament’s decision to surrender Kosovan autonomy (a decision made with the Parliament building surrounded by tanks, and helicopters and war planes flying overhead) 114 out of 123 Albanian MPs met on July 2, 1990 in the street outside the locked Parliament building and declared Kosova ‘an equal and independent entity within the framework of the Yugoslav federation’.

On September 7 the same delegates meet in Kacanik and issued the proclamation of a constitutional law for a ‘Republic of Kosova’ which laid down provisions for new elections for Parliament and of a Kosovar President.

In September 1991 a referendum was held which ratified the decision of the underground Parliament to declare Kosova a sovereign and independent republic.

Supposedly 87 per cent of eligible voters participated, with 99 per cent of them in favour. Accordingly Kosova was proclaimed independent on November 19, 1991. On May 24, 1992 elections were held, using private houses as polling stations.

The current that gained the most from this was the Democratic League of Kosova (LDK) of Ibrahim Rugova.

The LDK won 96 seats; the Parliamentary Party of Kosova (led by Adem Demaci) 13 seats; the Albanian Christian Democratic Party 7; the Albanian Peasant Party 7; and 2 seats were won by independents.

Five other seats went to Slav Muslim representatives. An additional 14 seats were held open for representatives of the Serb and Montenegrin populations, though these were not filled as only a small number of Serbs and Montenegrins participated in the election. Ibrahim Rugova was elected unopposed as President.

The Parliament never actually met. Decisions were, therefore, taken by Rugova and his closest associates without ever having to be debated in front of Kosovar representatives.

The basic strategy of Rugova was to avoid conflict with Belgrade, hence a policy of passive resistance. More militant actions were denounced as the work of provocateurs, acting on behalf of Belgrade. The hope was that western governments would reward the restraint shown by the Kosovars with recognition of Kosovan independence.

Such futile hopes were to be rudely shattered at Dayton, which encouraged wide sections of Kosovars to believe that they would only achieve their aims of an independent Kosova through violence. The Rugova project not only failed at an international level: it also had serious consequences inside Kosova itself.

The LDK decided to boycott all elections to the Serbian Parliament. As a result Arkan became MP for a Kosova seat and Milosevic remained in power. Albanians who advocated participation were denounced as traitors.

The attempt to create a parallel state increased the already greatly developed system of ‘apartheid’ in Kosova. By 1996 there was virtually no communication between Serbs and Albanians. They did not even use the same forms of transport: Serbs took the train while Albanians used buses. Most Albanians under twenty could neither speak nor understand Serbian. The responsibility for this situation lies, of course with Milosevic: nevertheless the policies of the LDK actually exacerbated it.

The LDK believed that the election of Sali Berisha as President in Albania in 1991 would bring Albanian assistance to Kosova. Berisha was from northern Albania and could, therefore be expected to be sympathetic to Kosova’s plight. In his early speeches he did indeed promise to provide all possible aid to Kosova. The realities of Albania’s poverty stricken economy – as well as pressure from western leaders – forced him to moderate his stance and declare Albania’s frontiers with Montenegro and Serbia to be inviolable.

Nevertheless the issue of unification with Albania did not go away. One of the foremost advocates of unification was Rexhep Qosja who criticised Rugova for his reliance on passive resistance and insisted that Serbs and Albanians had to separate. The same Rexhep Qosja was one of the signatories of the Rambouillet accord, which committed the KLA to disarming and remaining within Serbia.

Qosja’s attacks on Rugova were an indication of a growing opposition to the LDK policies. By 1996 there were 15 different Albanian parties in Kosova. The most vocal attacks came from Adem Demaci, who characterised democracy in Kosova as a caricature and denounced the LDK for its monopoly of power.

He was also savagely critical of the institutions of the parallel state. Demaci went on to argue that engagement with genuine Serbian opposition forces was more important than the hopeless goal of attracting Western attention.

Although Demaci stopped short of advocating armed struggle at that time he was shortly to become a leader of a new force in Kosova that would seriously challenge Rugova’s domination of Kosova political life: the UCK (Kosova Liberation Army).

The KLA

By mid-1998, the KLA had appointed Demaci’s party as its political leadership – a significant step given that Demaci advocated dialogue with non-nationalist Serbs. He argued that on gaining independence a Republic of Kosova could enter into a new and equal federation with Serbia and Montenegro, which he called ‘Balkanija’.

The sudden emergence of the KLA in late 1997 was because of the liberation of hundreds of thousands of weapons in Albania during the revolutionary uprising against the Berisha government earlier that year.

Many of these weapons found their way across the border to Kosova. Among those leading the resistance are many former officers of the old Yugoslav People’s Army and Kosovan Territorial Defence Forces, from the period previous to 1989.

Volunteers, arms and money have also come from the 600,000 Albanians working in Germany, Switzerland and other countries – the same people who largely financed Rugova in the past. Some of the money may well come from the Albanian ‘mafia’ and from drug smuggling.

In early 1999, the US relaunched its efforts to force the Kosovans to accept the plan. Given the Albanians’ natural disbelief that they could feel secure within Serbia, without their own armed forces and with the KLA disarmed, the US now offered a NATO "peacekeeping force" to police the deal.

Despite the original left-wing leadership of the KLA it has now clearly moved to the right, relying on NATO rather than its own strength.

It is, of course, easy to understand why many Kosovars see NATO as their salvation at the moment. The lack of any alternative leadership within the workers’ movement – not to mention the military power of NATO – would very easily push them in that direction. Nevertheless Demaci and others pressured the Kosovan delegation at Rambouillet to reject this attempt to ‘convince Albanians to accept capitulation, by launching illusions and empty promises’.

However, under massive pressure from pro-Western Albanian forces, the leading wing of the KLA finally capitulated. Demaci resigned from the leadership and is now in Slovenia. It is rumoured that the new KLA leadership have threatened to kill him as a traitor.

What’s in it for the west?

Kosova has some of the richest mineral wealth in the Balkans, including reserves of coal, nickel, lead, zinc, magnesium, lignite, kaolin, quartz, asbestos, limestone, marble, chrome and bauxite.

The ‘illusions’ Demaci spoke of flow from the political weakness of the KLA leadership, which has a ‘militaristic’ tendency to reject political struggle, identifying the failed politics of Rugova with politics in general. The KLA’s political declarations make no mention of the Serb minority, except to say that it is in the interests of ‘peace in the Balkans, for both the Serbs and the Albanians’ to end the occupation of Kosova.

In general, the KLA expresses little in the way of ideology, claiming last September, ‘We do not fight for party or political interests, as do the political parties in Kosova and Albania’. That is its real weakness.

It is notable that the supposedly more "militant" militarist faction ended up accepting Rambouillet while the "moderate" Demaci wing, which advocates dialogue with Serbs rejected Rambouillet as a capitulation to imperialism.

Certainly if Kosova is to gain independence it will be by following the lines advocated by Demaci rather than the present leadership of the KLA. NATO has made it plain on many occasions that it will not countenance an independent Kosova, and any NATO troops would be there either to prevent Kosovan independence or to enforce a partition they have negotiated with Milosevic.

Still less would NATO allow Kosova to become part of Albania. A political line that relies on NATO and fails to open up discussions with non-nationalist, anti-Milosevic Serbs is likely to lead to disaster.

Geoff Ryan

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