 |
||||
|
||||
|
Archive : ISG Pamphlets : War in the Balkans
The Expulsion of the Krajina Serbs
Some in the anti-war movement argue that before the recent expulsion of Kosovars the worst example of ethnic cleansing, the flight of 500,000 Serbs from the Krajina, was ignored — or even encouraged — by the west. Such claims have virtually become common-place at anti-war meetings. At the time of ’Operation Storm’, Socialist Outlook declared its total opposition to expelling the Krajina Serbs. We continue to defend unconditionally the right of the Krajina Serbs to return to their homes. We totally condemn attacks on the rights of Serbs by the Tudjman government and support their right to wide-spread autonomy within Croatia. At the very least they should have the same rights as the Italian minority in Istria. It goes without saying that as socialists we are completely opposed to Tudjman’s regime. There are many different estimates as to the number of Serbs who left the Krajina. We don’t wish to indulge in arguments about numbers: even if only one Serb had been forcibly expelled it would be one to many. We should however be clear about what actually happened in the Krajina and put it in its proper context. Certainly Tudjman announced measures that were clearly discriminatory against Serbs in Croatia. He has resurrected symbols of the Ustasa regime and attempted to minimise the brutality of that regime. Nevertheless, the Serb rebellion in 1990-91 was not a spontaneous rising against oppression of Serbs but was a deliberate attempt, orchestrated from Belgrade, to deny the right of Croatia to independence. The Serb secession actually took place before Croatia had declared independence. Virulent hostility was whipped up not only against Tudjman’s followers: Croat Communist Party leaders were also denounced as Ustase by Milosevic’s supporters. In the Serbian Republic of Krajina Croats were forcibly removed to create ethnically pure Serb areas. One third of Croatian territory was in the hands of Serb military and para-military forces until August 1995. The leaders of the Krajina Serbs were totally subordinated to Milosevic. When Milosevic fell out with Milan Babic, the then Krajina leader, (over withdrawal of Serb forces from Croatia to Bosnia) he overturned new election results three times until they finally resulted in victory for his new man, Milan Martic. The Krajina Serbs were never more than pawns in Milosevic’s Greater Serbia project. By summer 1995 the Bosnian Serbs were suffering military defeats at the hands of combined Bosniak and Croatian forces. Milosevic became concerned about preserving his own position: he therefore unceremoniously dumped Karadzic in Bosnia and Martic in the Krajina. Milosevic suddenly presented himself as a ’statesman’ who could bring the war in Bosnia to an end. The Croatian government was given the nod by Milosevic to reassert control over the whole of its territory. That is the context in which the Croatian army launched its offensive ’Operation Storm’ against the Krajina. The Krajina Serbs fled before the Croatian army, knowing that Milosevic would not lift a finger to help them. We do not have to believe that Tudjman was sincere in his appeals to Serbs to stay or his promise that anyone not guilty of war crimes would be welcome back. Those promises were certainly contradicted by the actions of Croatian soldiers and returning Croat refugees. Perhaps a few hundred Serbs who did stay were murdered and empty Serb houses were destroyed and looted for several days. That was undoubtedly a crime. Nevertheless the flight from the Krajina was not the same as the ’ethnic cleansing’ of Croats from the Krajina or Albanians from Kosova. Nor was it the same as ’ethnic cleansing’ carried out by Serb and Croat forces in Bosnia. In none of those cases did the leaders of the people being expelled simply acquiesce in the deed or encourage people to flee. In the Krajina, by contrast, Milosevic gave the Croatian government the green light to attack and left ’his’ people largely unable to resist. This was far more important than US readiness to give Tudjman a free hand (against, it should be noted, the opposition of Britain and France). The Krajina Serbs had gambled on all or nothing. When Milosevic withdrew his support they were left with nothing: they fled before the victorious Croatian army. Such a flight has more in common with the exodus of the pieds noirs from Algeria in the 1960s than it does with the systematic driving out of the Kosova Albanians. It doesn’t make it any the less tragic — but its dynamics are totally different.
|
|
||
Jeff Lowe