Archive : ISG Pamphlets : War in the Balkans

The Albanian National Movement

Geoff Ryan

1) Kosova Before Tito

During the Second World War Kosova was divided between Germany, which occupied the mineral rich northern part, Bulgaria in the east, with the rest going to Italy. The Italian occupied part was integrated into Albania, which had been invaded by Italy and attached to the Italian monarchy in 1938. After the fall of Mussolini, German forces occupied the whole of Kosova.

Many Kosovars welcomed the Italian invasion as it appeared to realise the dream of uniting all Albanians in a single state. The post-war settlement had resulted in a majority of Albanians (about 60 per cent) living outside Albania: approximately 70 per cent of them in Kosova. For the first time Albanian became the language of instruction in schools and was widely used throughout the administration. Serb and Montenegrin settlers — who had moved to Kosova during the colonisation of Kosova carried out by the Yugoslav government in the 1920s and 1930s — were attacked by Albanians. Over 10,000 Slav families were forced to leave Kosova. Nevertheless, Serb families who had lived in Kosova for generations suffered considerably less hostility.

A number of collaborationist organisations developed among Kosovar Albanians: the National Alliance of Albanians, the Second Prizren League, which claimed to represent all Albanians living in Albania and Yugoslavia, and Balli Kombetar. With the exception of the small number of Albanians who joined the ‘Skanderbeg’ volunteer SS division, most of these organisations — despite their collaboration — were not primarily pro-Nazi. They were motivated mainly by Albanian nationalism often combined with a marked anti-Communism.

Kosova was the area of weakest support for the Partisans. In the Summer of 1940 there were only 239 Party members in Kosova, of whom only 25 were Albanians. It was not until January 1943 that the first Albanian partisan unit — the ‘Zejnel Ajdini’ unit — carried out serious military activity in Kosova, when it ambushed a German column on the road south of Prishtinë. This success lead to the formation of a second Albanian unit (‘Emin Duraku’ unit) which attacked an Italian column in its first action, killing 23 soldiers.

Despite these successes, in August 1943 a CPY report stated "The movement in Kosovo is very weak, almost dead. It is completely cut off from the Albanian masses...Among the Albanian masses, the Communists are regarded as having sold themselves to the Serbs". In reality, the CPY was also weak amongst the Serbs of Kosova, most of whom supported the Serbian nationalist Cetnik movement.

As a result of the weaknesses of the Partisans the liberation of Kosova was carried out to a large extent by Bulgarian and Soviet forces, particularly in the East. Although both Albanian and Yugoslav Partisans fought against the Skanderbeg regiment in western Kosova, in most places the Partisans occupied towns after the German forces had left. The retreat of the Germans was also marked by an increase in anti-Partisan activities, which culminated in a widespread Albanian uprising in early 1945. Kosova was placed under martial law: thousands of Albanians were killed by the Partisans in the course of suppressing Albanian resistance.

2) Communist Parties of Yugoslavia and Albania on Kosova

Throughout the war both the Yugoslav and Albanian Partisans frequently changed their position on the status of Kosova. The issue was not even raised at the founding conference of the Communist Party of Albania. In August 1943, at Mukje, a village north of Tirana, a meeting was held between the CPA and Balli Kombetar which agreed on a common struggle for "an independent Albania and, through the application of the principle....of self-determination of peoples, for an ethnic Albania". This rather ambiguous formula on the future of Kosova was opposed by both the CPY and CPA leader Enver Hoxha who wrote to the CPA delegates at Mukje that they ‘should proclaim a war against fascism, not independence’. Nevertheless some references to self-determination, including the right to secession, had entered into CPA statements on Kosovo by the end of 1943 — with the approval of the CPY.

This change in policy was strengthened at a special conference of delegates from the two local committees of the CPY in Kosova. The Bujan conference, which was held between 31 December 1943 and 2 January 1944, was attended by 49 delegates, 42 of them ethnic Albanian. To a large extent it accepted the right of Kosova to secede from Yugoslavia and unite with Albania. This decision was, however, opposed by Tito.

In fact the CPY appears to have had no intentions of allowing Kosova to become part of Albania. Although Edvard Kardelj argued that unification of Kosova with Albania would be the best solution he nevertheless went on to claim that "because neither foreign nor domestic factors favour this, [Kosova] must remain a compact province within the framework of Serbia".

3) Kosova under Tito

Kosova was incorporated into Yugoslavia largely against the wishes of its inhabitants. The decision to join Kosova to Serbia was taken at a meeting in July 1945 of the Regional People’s Council of Kosova where a ‘draft resolution for the annexation of Kosovo-Metohija to federal Serbia’ was passed by acclamation. Significantly only 33 out of the 142 delegates to this meeting were Albanians. At the time there were some 50,000 Partisan troops in Kosova. Albanian opposition had, by then, been crushed.

Under the 1946 Constitution Kosova was recognised as an ‘Autonomous Region’ of Serbia, giving it a lower status than the ‘autonomous Province’ of Vojvodina. Albanians, despite being the third most numerous people in Yugoslavia (behind Serbs and Croats) were not recognised as a ‘Nation’ but merely as a ‘national minority’. Only ‘Nations’ could have their own republics within the federation: and only ‘Nations’ could secede. Moreover the Albanian population was dispersed between different republics: Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia proper as well as Kosova itself. Unlike Vojvodina, Kosova did not have its own independent legislature or its own supreme court. Its local administrative units had no independent decision making power.

Nevertheless, this was not an entirely cynical decision. Both the CPA and CPY leaders were, after 1945, in favour of building a wider Balkan federation and there is no reason to suppose that they did not believe that the question of Kosova’s future — and that of other Albanian communities in Yugoslavia — could not be settled amicably within this wider federation. Nor is there any reason to suppose that Tito accepted the cynical view of Stalin, as related by Milovan Djilas, that the Yugoslavs should just swallow Albania. Steps were in fact being taken towards closer Albanian-Yugoslav unity: in 1946 a ‘Treaty of Friendship’ established an economic agreement removing all customs barriers. There was some immigration from Albania to Kosova in this period — though on nothing like the scale claimed by modern Serb nationalists — and considerable crossing of the borders by Albanians from Kosova and Albania. Enver Hoxha produced plans for the unification of the Albanian and Yugoslav armies and, as late as March 1948 was urging Tito to take concrete steps towards the unification of the two states.

After the initial stage of repression, the CPY had also taken steps to meet some of the Kosovars demands. Although they reversed their original decision to refuse the right of Serb colonists to return to Kosova, in practice many former settlers — after their war-time experiences — showed no desire to return. As a result nearly 16,000 hectares of land was distributed to Albanians. The Albanian language was given equal status, at least in theory, with Serbo-Croat in legal and official matters.

In practice there was little change at first since most officials were Slavs, while 74 per cent of all Kosova Albanians over the age of ten were illiterate. There were only about 300 Albanian school teachers in 1945, requiring the recruitment of teachers from Albania itself. These small but important measures came to an end with the Stalin-Tito split in 1948 when the Albanian leadership became one of the most implacable opponents of the Yugoslavs.

4) Effects of The Stalin-Tito Split

The split with Stalin, and consequently Albania, led to a period of increased repression of the Albanian population of Yugoslavia. Belgrade was afraid that the Albanian CP would try to mobilise the large Albanian population in Yugoslavia to overthrow the Tito regime. At the same time the Hoxha regime in Albania accused dissidents of being Titoist agents. Hence the border between the two states was sealed, leading to virtual isolation between Albanians on different sides of the border for several decades.

The Yugoslav leadership took measures to reduce the Albanian population. In particular they embarked on a campaign of ‘Turkification’ in which Albanians in Kosova and Macedonia were encouraged to register themselves as ethnic Turks. This process was aided by Turks being declared a national minority in 1951, while Turkish schools were opened in Kosova. The success of this policy can be seen from census figures. In 1948 there were 1,315 Turks in Kosova: by 1953 this had risen to 34,583. In the same year large scale emigration of Kosova’s ‘Turks’ to Turkey was permitted. Between 1954 and 1957 some 195,000 Albanians left for Turkey, to be replaced by new Serb and Montenegrin colonists.

The ‘Turkification’ policy appears, therefore, to have largely been a means of persuading large numbers of an Albanian community viewed with suspicion to leave the country. Nevertheless it did have one positive aspect: significant numbers of Serbs, Albanians and Turks were trilingual. Today the majority of Serbs and Kosovars are almost totally ignorant of each others language.

Throughout the 1950s the Albanian population remained largely cowed, subject to continual repression. There were, however, signs of resistance. On May Day 1956 four Kosovar youths flew an Albanian flag in Djakovica. Over the next few months Albanian flags were unfurled over government buildings, schools and on trains. The result was increased repression, with thousands of arrests. Albanian houses were regularly searched for weapons and since the secret police assumed that every Albanian household had at least one gun then anyone failing to produce a weapon was likely to be arrested on suspicion of hiding it.

1956 was certainly the worst year of that decade for the Kosovars. In June and July three dervish sheikhs, along with Nijazi Maljoku (editor of Rilindja — Kosova’s Albanian language paper — and nephew of Mehmet Hoxha, a minister in the Serbian government) were secretly put on trial in Prizren, alongside several illiterate peasants. The defendants all received heavy prison sentences. Yet the trial also revealed the beginnings of a change in orientation by the Yugoslav leadership. The UDBa secret police had also wanted to arrest Fadil Hoxha (war time partisan leader) and several other leading Communists but were over-ruled by the Foreign Ministry which was trying to develop a rapprochement with the USSR and Albania and therefore wanted to avoid another ‘Cominformist’ scandal. All the accused were released 12 years later and proclaimed innocent. Although repression continued after 1956 the new orientation was to lead to important changes in the position of the Kosovars in the following decade.

The period 1956-60 saw the development of Albanian literary circles in Kosova, in which Adem Demaqi — a future leader of the Kosova Liberation Army — first came to prominence. In his novel Serpents of Blood Demaqi painted a damning picture of the appalling social and economic backwardness of Kosova, in which blood feuds were still common. The novel became extremely popular, as a result of which it was banned. Two years later Demaqi was jailed for denouncing the forced deportation of hundreds of thousands of Albanians on the pretext that they were Turks. Other Kosova writers of this period were also forced into exile, or jailed.

5) The 1963 and 1974 Constitutions

The 1963 Constitution had a number of contradictory effects on the Kosovars. In some ways it made their situation worse: unlike the 1946 Constitution the autonomous regions were no longer constitutive parts of the Federation. The Republics themselves were given the right to create — or disband — autonomous areas. At the same time there was an increase in the number of Kosovar deputies to the Federal Chamber of Nationalities and Kosova now had the same status as Vojvodina — though mainly because that of Vojvodina was reduced. At one level the 1963 Constitution represented the low point of Albanian fortunes in Yugoslavia. Nevertheless the Albanian’s position was about to improve.

In 1966, Tito purged Alexander Rankovic, head of the UDBa. Allegations were made about brutal treatment of Albanians (and Hungarians) in Yugoslavia by Rankovic and the security services. Although the removal of Rankovic was probably motivated by in-fighting within the Yugoslav bureaucracy rather than any concern for the Albanians, its effect was to stimulate Albanian activity and demands for greater autonomy. Rezak Salja, the Kosova Provincial Prosecutor, even called for a separate republic for the Albanians of Yugoslavia, with the right to self-determination and secession. Tito naturally rejected this demand but in 1967 he visited Kosova, a visit that was seen by Albanians as endorsing their demands.

The slogan ‘Kosova — Republic’ was first heard on the streets during demonstrations on November 27, 1968 in Prishtinë and several other Kosova towns. Other slogans included: ‘We want a University’; ‘Down with colonial policy in Kosova’; ‘Long live Albania’; and ‘Long Live Enver Hoxha’. Demonstrations rapidly spread throughout Kosova and into Macedonia. These demonstrations resulted in amendments to both the federal and Serbian Constitutions in 1968 and 1969, as a result of which judicial and legislative rights passed to the autonomous provinces which were given direct representation in the federal assembly. The autonomous provinces were now defined as ‘socio-political communities’, the same term used to define the Republics.

In addition, Kosova was given greater priority in distribution of central economic funds, though the results of this were very uneven. Kosova was also given its own university and flag (that of Albania). In a further concession to Albanian national feeling the name of the province was changed from Kosovo-Metohija to Kosovo. (The term Metohija comes from the Greek word metoh, meaning church. Metohija refers to land previously granted to the Serbian Orthodox church and, since it implies Serbian ownership of this land, was deeply offensive to Albanians).

Support for Albania and Enver Hoxha were no longer treated as treasonable activities as they would have been even a few years earlier. It is doubtful, in fact, whether there was much real support for Enver Hoxha in Kosova. The earliest known pro-Tirana movement in Kosova — the Revolutionary Movement for the Unification of the Albanians — was not founded till the early 1960s, by Adem Demaqi, and probably had no more than about 300 members. Most Kosovars who had visited Albania would certainly have found little to enthuse them in Hoxha’s state.

Nevertheless the raising of pro-Albanian slogans and their tolerance by the Yugoslav authorities 0marked a changing relationship between Belgrade and Tirana following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. 1968 marked the five hundredth anniversary of the death of the great Albanian national hero Skanderbeg. This event was celebrated in both Kosova and Albania. Greater links were developed with Albania in this period.

There was even encouragement for the adoption of the Tosk dialect, the dialect of Albania, as the official language of Kosova in preference to the Gheg dialect spoken by most Kosovars. This measure, however, had a negative effect on many Slavs in Kosova who complained they could no longer understand the local Albanians.

The turn towards Albania was also reflected in the growth of the University of Prishtinë, which saw a huge increase in students of the liberal arts, especially Albanian history and literature. There were also major efforts to increase the number of Albanians in the administrative apparatus of Kosova. These gains were consolidated in the 1974 Constitution which made Kosova (and Vojvodina) a Republic in all but name. Following the 1974 Constitution there was increased Albanianisation of the province, with bilingualism a necessary qualification for employment in public services and four fifths of available posts reserved for Albanians.

Nevertheless, there was also repression of Albanians following the 1974 Constitution. In 1974 students in Prishtinë demonstrated, demanding the union of Albanian majority regions of Macedonia and Montenegro with Kosova. The following year a large number of students were jailed for organising a ‘Kosova National Liberation Movement’, which argued for unity with Albania. Other Enverist organisations, the ‘Revolutionary Movement of Albanians’ and the ‘Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Albanians in Yugoslavia’ were suppressed. In 1976 Adem Demaqi, along with 18 other defendants, was again put on trial, charged with various ‘crimes’ including ‘organising against the people and the state’, ‘hostile propaganda’ and forming the ‘National Liberation Movement of Kosova’. The defendants were sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. Further arrests followed the centennial celebrations in 1978 of the founding of the League of Prizren — the first Albanian national movement of modern times.

6) After Tito’s death

The 1974 Constitution raised Kosova Albanians hopes and their consciousness of being Albanian but saw little improvement in living standards. The massive expansion of higher education at the University of Prishtinë was not matched by increased job opportunities — not least because, as noted above, the vast majority of graduates had studied liberal arts.

In 1981-2 there were demonstrations of Albanian students in Prishtinë and throughout the province. They were brutally repressed by over 30,000 soldiers. The official number of deaths was given as eleven — many Albanians claim the total was nearly one thousand. Initially these demonstrations were a reaction to the very poor conditions in the Universities. They very soon spread beyond students, with increasing numbers of Albanian workers joining, and took on a more political significance. The demand for a Kosova Republic was raised along with slogans such as: ‘Unification with Albania’; ‘We are Albanians not Yugoslavs’ and ‘Long live Adem Demaqi’, who, as noted above, was once again in jail.

Again there was probably little real enthusiasm for Enver Hoxha in Kosova, though increased cultural exchanges had stimulated a much greater interest in the neighbouring state. Despite Yugoslav claims there is, however, no evidence of Tirana having played any role in organising the demonstrations. Indeed, the Albanian government frequently handed over to the Yugoslav authorities ‘subversives’ who had sought shelter there.

By and large pro-Albania sentiment was stronger amongst the Kosova exile community, particularly in Germany where there was a pro-Albania organisation called the Red National Front. Yet even this organisation called only for an Albanian Republic of Kosova inside the Yugoslav federation. Several members of this organisation were killed by the Yugoslav Secret Service during the 1980s.

However, after 1981 some Tirana-orientated groups did gain some support, mainly amongst students in Kosova but with some influence amongst the peasantry. The Yugoslav news agency claimed, on March 10 1984, that seventy two illegal organisations had been discovered between 1981-83. Some of these organisations certainly engaged in assassination of Yugoslav politicians and officials in a number of European states.

Although martial law was lifted after two months there was a steady erosion of Kosovar rights. In September 1981 strict censorship was imposed on the teaching of Albanian history, while the quotas for Kosovar students were gradually reduced. Nor was this confined to Kosova. Hundreds of Albanians were jailed in Macedonia and an attempt was made to make displaying the Albanian flag illegal — despite the fact that there had been no riots in Macedonia.

Kosova Albanians divided into three positions: supporters of irredentism; defenders of the policies of the LCY leadership; and those who sympathised with the irredentists while claiming to support the policies of the LCY. This was the largest current. Among the youth, however, there was growing enthusiasm for Albania, preferring to watch Albanian TV or listen to Radio Tirana. There was a gradual turning away from the problems of Yugoslavia and a belief in an Albanian future.

7) The Rise of the LDK

The overturning by Milosevic of Kosova’s constitutional position in 1989 was opposed by virtually all sectors of the Kosovar community. Miners from the Trepca mines went on strike, including a hunger strike underground. The Kosova Parliament surrendered Kosovan autonomy when the Parliament building was surrounded by tanks and helicopters and war planes were flying overhead. In response, 114 out of 123 Albanian members of the Kosova Parliament met on July 2, 1990 in the street outside the locked Parliament building and declared Kosova ‘an equal and independent entity within the framework of the Yugoslav federation’.

On September 7 1990 the same delegates meet in Kacanik and issued the proclamation of a constitutional law for a ‘Republic of Kosova’ which laid down provisions for new elections for Parliament and of a Kosovar President. In September 1991 a referendum was held which ratified the decision of the underground Parliament to declare Kosova a sovereign and independent republic. Supposedly 87 per cent of eligible voters participated, with 99 per cent of them in favour. Accordingly Kosova was proclaimed independent on November 19, 1991. On May 24, 1992 elections were held, using private houses as polling stations.

The current that gained the most from this was the Democratic League of Kosova of Ibrahim Rugova. The choice of the term League was deliberately chosen to echo the League of Prizren. This organisation had its origins in the Association of Philosophers and Sociologists of Kosova and the Association of Writers of Kosova (especially after most Serbs left the latter in 1988 for a purely Serb organisation).

In the May 1992 elections the LDK won 96 seats; the Parliamentary Party of Kosova (led by Adem Demaqi) 13 seats; the Albanian Christian Democratic Party 7; the Albanian Peasant Party 7; and 2 seats were won by independents. Five other seats went to Slav Muslim representatives. An additional 14 seats were held open for representatives of the Serb and Montenegrin populations, though these were not filled as only a small number of Serbs and Montenegrins participated in the election. Ibrahim Rugova was elected unopposed as President.

The elections led to a total domination of the national movement by the LDK — especially since the Parliament never actually met. Decisions were, therefore, taken by Rugova and his closest associates without ever having to be debated in front of Kosovar representatives. Despite the fact that only one state — Albania — recognised the new Kosova state Rugova behaved as if he actually controlled a real state. A government in exile was set up, along with independent schools in Kosova, forced to take place in houses, garages etc, because of the closure of Albanian schools by the Serbs. Parallel Albanian health clinics also operated after the mass sackings of Albanians from the Serbian run health care system. Money for the independent Kosova republic was raised from Albanian exile communities but this was by no means sufficient to ensure the functioning of the parallel state. The health facilities were particularly of poor quality, even insanitary.

The basic strategy of Rugova was to avoid conflict with Belgrade, hence a policy of passive resistance. More militant actions were denounced as the work of provocateurs, acting on behalf of Belgrade. The hope was that western governments would reward the restraint shown by the Kosovars with recognition of Kosovan independence. Such futile hopes were to be rudely shattered at Dayton, which encouraged wide sections of Kosovars to believe that they would only achieve their aims of an independent Kosova through violence. The Rugova project not only failed at an international level: it also had serious consequences inside Kosova itself. The LDK decided to boycott all elections to the Serbian Parliament. As a result Arkan became MP for a Kosova seat and Milosevic remained in power. Albanians who advocated participation were denounced as traitors. The attempt to create a parallel state increased the already greatly developed system of ‘apartheid’ in Kosova. By 1996 there was virtually no communication between Serbs and Albanians. They did not even use the same forms of transport: Serbs took the train while Albanians used buses. Most Albanians under twenty could neither speak nor understand Serbian. The responsibility for this situation lies, of course with Milosevic: nevertheless the policies of the LDK actually exacerbated it.

The LDK believed that the election of Sali Berisha as President in Albania in 1991 would bring Albanian assistance to Kosova. Berisha was a Gheg speaker from northern Albania and could, therefore be expected to be sympathetic to Kosova’s plight. In his early speeches he did indeed promise to provide all possible aid to Kosova. The realities of Albania’s poverty stricken economy — as well as pressure from western leaders — forced him to moderate his stance and declare Albania’s frontiers with Montenegro and Serbia to be inviolable. In July 1992 Rugova visited Albania and discussed with Albanian Prime Minister Alexander Meksi. Although the meetings were cordial, and had some beneficial effects in the field of education, the Albanian government was unable to offer anything more concrete than continuing support for Kosova’s eventual independence.

Nevertheless the issue of unification with Albania did not go away. One of the foremost advocates of unification was Rexhep Qosja who criticised Rugova for his reliance on passive resistance and insisted that Serbs and Albanians had to separate. (Qosja was to be one of the signatories of the Rambouillet accord, which committed the KLA to disarming and remaining within Serbia.)

Qosja’s attacks on Rugova were an indication of a growing opposition to the LDK policies. By 1996 there were 15 different Albanian parties in Kosova. It was, however, difficult to organise any coherent opposition to Rugova. Not only had the Kosova Parliament not met but elections due to be held in May 1996 were cancelled.

The most vocal attacks came from Adem Demaqi, who characterised democracy in Kosova as a caricature and denounced the LDK for its monopoly of power. He was savagely critical of the institutions of the parallel state. Demaqi also argued that engagement with genuine Serbian opposition forces was more important than the hopeless goal of attracting Western attention. Although at that time Demaqi stopped short of advocating armed struggle, he was shortly to become a leader of a new force in Kosova that would seriously challenge Rugova’s domination of Kosova political life: the UCK (Kosova Liberation Army).

Geoff Ryan

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