Archive : ISG Pamphlets : War in the Balkans

The Murder of Bosnia - Part Four

Geoff Ryan

The Break Up of Yugoslavia

All the other Republics were also experiencing acute economic crises. However, their solutions were radically different. The richer economies of Slovenia and Croatia (with its revenue from tourism) objected to money being allocated to prop up the bankrupt economies (literally in some cases) of the poorer Republics. These were not, of course, new objections. Similar views were expressed in the heated debates of the 1960s. But because of the absence of any genuine socialist democracy this very real problem of economic differentiation — and the necessary transfer of resources between the Republics — could not be democratically agreed upon by the people of Yugoslavia. Since every section of the bureaucracy, at Republican and Federal level, agreed on the need for even greater reliance on market forces, the result was to increase the centrifugal tendencies inherent in the Federal structure and the system of "self-management".

At a political level, differentiations began to develop within the bureaucracy. In Serbia, economically backward compared to the northern Republics and facing a growing economic crisis, there was a growing nationalist movement in response to the Kosova rebellion — a mood that Slobodan Milosevic was able to latch on to in the course of the 1980s. This movement was both Serbian nationalist and centralist. Milosevic was hailed as "the greatest Serb leader since Rankovic" , the hated, ultra-Stalinist removed by Tito in 1965.

Crucially it was able to win the backing of the army leadership which, like army chiefs everywhere, preferred a strong, centralised state. The majority of army officers (about 70%) were Serbs and Montenegrins [1] (though it is far from clear that this was a deliberate policy – rather it was a reflection of the much stronger historic traditions of militarism in Serbia and even more so in Montenegro). However, Serbian domination of the army was consolidated and reinforced by the use of Serbian as the official language of the army (a policy justified by claims about the need for a common language to allow a clear chain of command, understanding of orders etc). Such a policy clearly discriminated against those whose main language was not Serbian (including Croats who would have difficulty in understanding written communications), who made up the majority of the soldiers. Moreover, the army remained a purely Federal institution. The different Republics and the Autonomous Provinces had their own Territorial Defence Forces – set up because of the fear of Soviet invasion following the intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 – but not their own armies. The Defence Forces were subject to overall control by the Federal army – which facilitated their disarming in the period leading up to the invasion of Slovenia. This Serbian domination of the army at the highest levels, explains the way in which it has acted in support of Milosevic – or perhaps, more accurately, we should say that Milosevic has acted on behalf of the army. It was these Serbian army chiefs (active or retired) who tried to form a new Communist Party (League of Communist-Movement for Yugoslavia) [2] after the collapse of the League of Communists at its 14th Congress in 1990.

Because Belgrade was both the Serbian and Federal capital the Federal institutions also tended to have higher percentages of Serbs. In Croatia and, in particular, in Slovenia, on the other hand, the CP leaderships allowed much greater political freedoms and moved in the direction of further decentralisation. Their positions were essentially ’Republican` — that is, greater rights for the Republics as they currently existed, including their national and ethnic composition — not nationalist. Massive demonstrations against the Federal army took place in Slovenia in 1988 following reports that the army was preparing to intervene to put down the ’counter-revolution`. Three Slovene journalists and a soldier were put on trial for handling a "secret military" document : in a blatant violation of the Federal Constitution the trial was conducted in Serbo-Croat, not Slovenian, further increasing Slovene nationalist feelings.

However, the leaderships of the other Republican parties largely failed to respond to the key question — the violation of Albanian national rights. [3] Apart from a few token protests they treated the repression in Kosova as an internal Serb affair. Despite the undoubted desire of the Croatian and Slovene CPs to maintain a unified Yugoslavia — albeit on a modified basis — their failure to defend Kosova, to organise opposition on an all-Yugoslav scale not only allowed the rise of right-wing nationalism in Serbia, it also created the conditions in Slovenia , and especially Croatia, for the rise of right-wing nationalist currents.

The Rise of Serbian Nationalism

The recreation of a unified Yugoslav state had only been possible on the basis of equality of nations and nationalities (apart from the Albanians). This required a guarantee that there would be no possibility of the rise of the strongest power, Serbia, into a dominant position, such as it had enjoyed in the pre-war 1st Yugoslavia. The response by a section of the Serbian Party to the Kosova events began to challenge this settlement — not least because it was a useful diversion from the serious economic difficulties confronting Serbia. Moreover, the most Stalinised and repressive wing was joined by many of the former critics of the Tito regime around the journal Praxis. This capitulation by ex-Marxists such as former Praxis editors Mihailo Markovic and Ljubomir Tadic was part of a wholesale capitulation to nationalism by the Serbian intelligentsia. [4] On the whole the working class of Serbia remained aloof, if not hostile, to the rise of nationalism , at least until the late 1980s. The power base of Milosevic was primarily the Belgrade party machinery, the Belgrade press, which was rapidly brought under Milosevic’s control, the Serbian intelligentsia and the army — backed up with appeals to Serbs living in Kosova, Croatia, Vojvodina and Bosnia. These were frequently to be found in the most rural — and therefore most backward — regions. Moreover, Milosevic formed an alliance with the previously dormant Serbian Orthodox Church whose influence was, of course, particularly strong amongst the Serbs of the most backward rural regions.

The Serbian nationalists initially based their campaign on supposed atrocities committed against Serbs living in Kosova. The press ran a massive anti-Albanian campaign. It was in response to the Kosova rebellion that the first charges of ’ethnic cleansing` and rape were made, supposedly carried out by Albanians against Serbs. (Branka Magas [5] clearly shows there is no substance to these allegations: the level of rape was no worse in Kosova than anywhere else in Yugoslavia and the vast majority of cases were of Albanian women by Albanian men.). The ensuing battle inside the Serbian CP resulted in the eventual victory of the most nationalist forces around Milosevic. The nationalist campaign began to attack the Federal basis of Yugoslavia as some plot by "the Croat" Tito and "the Slovene" Kardelj against the Serbian people — in alliance with the Vatican, Cominform, imperialism etc. In particular the 1974 Constitution came under fierce attack. The solution put forward was a centralised Yugoslav state under Serbian domination. Under Milosevic, for the first time ever, celebrations were held to celebrate the founding of the first Yugoslavia. Milosevic referred to Yugoslavia as a 70-year old state -indicating the extent to which the Serbian leadership had broken from the policies of Tito. It was only after the rapid defeat of the Federal army in its attempted invasion of Slovenia in 1991 that Milosevic changed his policy. Having failed to prevent Slovene independence he then embarked upon the policy of a "Greater Serbia", the logic of which inevitably led to war in Croatia and Bosnia.

After Milosevic came to power in 1987 he set about changing the old balance of forces. By the following year he had replaced the leadership of the Vojvodina party By 1989 the Montenegrin leadership had also been replaced — not least because it was unable to deal with the growing working class militancy in response to the economic crisis — and the Serbian constitution unilaterally changed, abolishing the autonomy of the 2 provinces. This was, of course, equally a violation of the Federal Yugoslav constitution. However, Kosova and Vojvodina still retained their places on the Federal institutions, giving Milosevic 4 guaranteed votes.

The rise of Serbian nationalism led initially to a rise of Republicanism in the other Republics who clearly felt threatened — not least because part of Milosevic’s programme was to continue the project already set in train in Kosova, encouraging the Serb populations outside Serbia to oppose the dominant Republican sentiments in the Republics where they lived. Moreover, Slovenia (partially), Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina had been disarmed by the confiscation of the weapons belonging to their Territorial defence units. Whilst in Croatia this Republicanism soon gave way to the rise of ethnic Croatian nationalism, in Bosnia there remained a strong Bosnian identity.

A secret meeting of the (suspended) Albanian deputies to the Kosova assembly declared an independent Republic in 1990. Referenda or decisions by Republican Parliaments on independence followed in Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. However, all these moves towards independence took place within the framework of exercising their guaranteed constitutional right to self-determination and an attempt to maintain a unified state. They were fundamentally defensive responses to rising Serbian nationalism. It was the unilateral overturning of the Federal Constitution by Milosevic, the attempt to mobilise the Serbian populations of Kosova and Croatia (and later Bosnia) against the Republican governments and to create a Serbian dominated, highly centralised state that led to the putting into practice of the declarations of independence. The final straw was the refusal by Milosevic to recognise the right of the Croat nominee Stipe Mesic to take his place as head of the collective presidency.

In the 1980s all the structures that had held Yugoslavia together were rapidly falling apart. The economy was in serious difficulties. The CPY was rapidly losing its authority. In every Republic and Autonomous Province, except for Serbia and Montenegro, there was a drastic decline in party membership, especially amongst the youth. [6] There were two very different solutions being put forward within the League of Communists: Slovenia and Croatia argued for a looser confederation, Serbia for a more centralised state. Given the absence of socialist democracy it was inevitable that disagreements would take the form of conflict between different Republican leaders. However, it was by no means inevitable that this would end in war. Various attempts were made by the Slovene and Croatian LC leaders to find solutions within a ’Yugoslav’ framework. Even after multi-party elections had brought nationalist parties to power in the various Republics attempts were still made to find a solution. Izetbegovic of Bosnia and Gligorov of Macedonia tried to find a compromise between the confederal positions of Slovenia and Croatia and the rigid centralism of Serbia.

It is certainly not the case that the Slovene and Croatian party leaders, or their nationalist successors, were without blame for the crisis. They frequently only showed an interest in the problems of their own Republics. They were certainly not only motivated by altruism. However, the decision to resolve the conflict by military means was that of Slobodan Milosevic and the leaders of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA).

Geoff Ryan

NOTES

[1] Most of modern day Montenegro remained independent of both the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires. Montenegrins are divided about their origins and history. A majority see themselves as related to the Serbs and consequently have tended to follow Serbian leadership and identify with Greater Serbia projects. A minority insist on a separate Montenegrin identity. Montenegrins have been the nation most likely to join the Communist Party — approximately 1 in 4 is a member.

[2] One of those involved with the formation of the LC-MY was the wife of Slobodan Milosevic. She also had her own party in the recent Serbian elections. However, this is not an indication of independent activity on her part but an attempt by Milosevic to cover all eventualities. It is rather reminiscent of when Ian Paisley stood his wife for election to Belfast City Council. If she lost it was a defeat for her, whereas if she won it was a victory for her husband.

[3] Milan Kucan and the leadership of the Slovenian League of Communists did protest about the repression in Kosova in 1989. They were partially supported by the LC of Croatia. By then, however, it was too late. The Slovene and Croat working class organised wide-spread support for the Kosova miners’ protest.

[4] Indeed some Serbian intellectual such as the novelist Dobrica Cosic — until recently President of Milosevic’s rump ’Yugoslavia’ — had expressed nationalist sentiments even when he was a loyal Titoist. To appreciate the degeneration of Mihailo Markovic compare the infamous Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences of 1986, in which he demands greater repression of the Albanian population of Kosova and his article published in Inprecor Feb 27, 1975 in which he analyses how the bureaucracy attempts to whip up nationalist hysteria.

[5] Destruction of Yugoslavia, p61-62. Indeed, despite all Milosevic’s claims of massacres of Serbs the first Serb to die in political violence was Branivoje Milinovic, an 18 year old student killed by Milosevic’s own police in Belgrade on 9th March 1991. He was not even one of the student protesters demonstrating against the Milosevic regime. He had simply gone into Belgrade to buy some cassettes and inadvertently found himself in the middle of a police riot.

[6] See Cohen, op cit, p48.

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